Andy Blunden October 2004

19 Theses on the politics of scare-mongering
Draft outline of an article submitted to Arena Journal, October 2004

1. Any analysis of the politics of scare-mongering must rest on consideration of the general structure of anxiety, risk-aversion and risk-seeking in a society, as well as the institutional structures implicated in scare-mongering.
2. Scare-mongering is not the exclusive property of any of political camp, but is used by all parties, social movements, lobby groups, professional and special interest organisations.
3. Life is neither more nor less risky today than at any other time; no-one could ever pay attention to all the dangers and potential gambles life presents; the point is not the quantity of risk, but the structure of risk, risk perception (selection of risks) and response to risk (blame).

• Life-expectancy has increased and infant mortality reduced in all countries, this is the most objective refutation of the idea that modern life is more risky than in the past;
• In the developed world, exposure to the dangers of war, mass unemployment, political extremism and natural disasters has dramatically declined by comparison with previous generations;
• On the other hand, uncertainty about personal relationships, ethical and moral norms and the continuity of family and employment relations has increased.
• People are more conscious of the possibility of man-made catastrophes such as nuclear war and accidents, global warming and pollution, but here in Australia, we are also aware of how natural disasters have been manufactured by past generations.

4. Perception of risk and risk attribution reflect ethical and moral sentiment which are objectified in social institutions generating, advertising and coping with risks.

• Advertising a threat is usually a coded way of expressing moral outrage;
• A group of people may object to exposure to a risk as unjust because they have done nothing to deserve it or have not participated in deciding on the risk, or because those who do deserve it or have made the risky decision, are escaping exposure; a risk can be unfairly distributed;
• A risk is particularly objectionable if it is imposed by someone who profits by exposing others to the risk — exploitation. If the same risk were perceived as having natural origin (increasingly unlikely today) it would not be found objectionable;
• A group or institution may exaggerate a threat to cover up or substitute for a wrong it has itself done to someone, implicating others in the misery affecting victims of their own action or neglect (guilt);
• the attribution of natural disasters to human misbehaviour expresses moral disapproval of the behaviour in question — “homosexuality causes AIDS” — stigmatisation;
• Refusal to believe in accidents of nature, and preferring to search for a responsible authority (blaming paediatric doctors for sick babies, governments for not anticipating a natural disaster) is partly due to the belief that these professionals are self-seeking and not to be trusted, and partly also the conviction that anything, including health and safety, can be purchased or provided as a public service; any accident is therefore the result of some kind of swindle or professional incompetence. Whereas in the past, misfortune was due to sin, nowadays, virtue is earning enough to buy what you want on the market;
• Victim-blaming and attribution of human failings to nature express a desire to avoid conflict. These are not socially approved attitudes nowadays.

5. The nature/culture division is determined differently by different cultures, but generally speaking culture, and therefore the scope for blame and responsibility is very broad today:

• There is little belief in “accidents” or a natural world beyond human control, so misfortune must be someone’s fault and consequently a moral outrage;
• Where blame is placed depends on ethical expectations and moral sentiments.

6. Human beings are by nature somewhat over-intrepid (we drive cars, eat fatty food, marry and have children); risk-aversion is above all an expression of moral revulsion and political enmity.

• People normally ignore rare threats, so the advertising of a far-flung danger is invariably an expression of a moral disposition.

7. Scares campaigns are effective if they are presented to the public with skill and are:

• aligned with a relevant moral sentiment,
• backed by a recognized, relevant authority,
• given a human face, be it a sympathetic victim or a heinous perpetrator.

8. Scares can be dispelled by sufficiently skilful and resolute action:

• making the implicit moral/ethical message explicit, and specifically negating it, if possible finding an alternative moral reading of the phenomenon;
• exposing the authority as bogus, self-interested, untrustworthy, and preferably involved in a cover-up of the real cause for concern;
• transforming the perception of the “human face” — (“that nurse was actually the ambassador’s wife,” “actually the Iraqis treated me very well”) and if possible finding a better, countervailing “human face”;
• using superior, disinterested, informed and trusted authority to rationally critique the alleged facts point by point.

However, the most difficult problem is the underlying conditions which predispose people to believe certain kinds of scares which align with their moral sentiments and specific insecurities. This can only be dealt with by changing social practices.

9. People who have access to the world only through the TV (or otherwise through a restricted channel), are more likely to be afraid of something than people who are practically exposed to the relevant risk and are consequently familiar with it. This observation does point to a vulnerability in modern society as much of our personal communication is supplanted by the mass media.

• society is overall much more tolerant of difference than a generation ago, partly due to the proliferation of mass media, but some people have little exposure to some other kinds of people, other than through TV, and consequently are vulnerable to scare campaigns about issues which actually rarely affect them;

10. The means of public communication have a great role to play in transmitting scare campaigns, but equally in debunking scares. The media is an arena of struggle over risk as much as any other institution or any other part of society; consequently it would be wrong to single out the media (as a whole) in blame for scare campaigns — different social forces are at work within it.

• The media is of course generally expressive of certain social interests, and will therefore tend to transmit the relevant scares.

11. In a “post-materialist” society, distribution of bads overtakes the distribution of goods as the central problem of distributive justice.

• It is rational for people who have escaped from the struggle for survival to be sensitive to dangers that would be ignored by people who struggle just to exist.
• The same people might also choose risk-taking activities for pleasure, something unthinkable for someone who risks their life daily in the struggle for existence.
• Having no voice in the distribution of risks in society is the principle axis of injustice. People are tolerant of risks they choose themselves on the basis of reasonable information.
• This observation still leaves open which risks will get attention and who will be blamed.

12. The level of risk-seeking and risk-aversion is normative — the lifestyle of dominant cultural groups setting a standard for others whose lifestyle would normally be associated with a different level of risk-taking.

• In a society where there is little risk-taking, exposure to any risk appears as an injustice in the same way as poverty appears as injustice in a society of generalised affluence.
• Conversely, those who are exposed to manifestly less risk than the social norm could (a) seek more risk, (b) exaggerate the riskiness of their own life-style, (c) disbelieve the riskiness of others’ lives (d) adopt a stance of moral superiority.

13. Shared perception of risk is a means of social control and cooperation, just as much is a shared conception of the good. Those who engage in risky behaviour are social deviants.
14. The poor are rational to be interested in low-probability/high-reward practices (gambling) and relatively indifferent to risks (it couldn’t get any worse); those better off are rational to be averse to low-probability disasters (and take out insurance) and relatively uninterested in gambles.
15. Institutions draw attention to threats at their own level, and relevant to their own domain of responsibility;

• MacCarthyism operated within an environment of communitarianism and conformism, and identified a threat to the whole community (communist takeover), tending to reinforce conformity;
• the paedophilia, medical and crime scares of recent times operate within a society in which social ties have been reduced to the minimum, identifying threats to the individual and close-family, tending to increase isolation and fragmentation.

16. Institutions have to be able to protect agents and decision-makers from blame, to avoid paralysing defensive action. The trend toward privatisation of public responsibility, promotes litigation and public liability insurance, adding to ever-expanding regulations which are paralysing institutions. The two possible responses are:

• closing ranks and covering up, protecting individuals and wearing the heat at institutional level, or
• delegation of responsibility downwards to individuals, prompting risk aversion by the vulnerable individuals and insurance.

The latter response is normal in Australia today.

17. Institutions and groups advertise dangers which affect their own interests, at the expense of larger dangers which affect other groups, but not themselves. Women’s groups exaggerate the dangers of breast implants, rape, domestic violence; charities highlight the dangers of gambling, poverty, exploitative employers; employer groups demand the need for instant dismissal, deregulation, etc. This mirrors the fact that institutions by definition promote goods specific to their social role.
18. To the extent that people and groups identify themselves as victims, they perceive all risks as involuntary and unjust, willingly embrace scare campaigns which reinforce their status as victims, and seek compensation and recognition for the harm they suffer.

• The claim to be recognised as victims is an increasingly common mode of the politics of recognition;
• To the extent that people see themselves as architects of their own destiny — risk comes in the same package as benefit and is their own business, not a matter of injustice.

19. When you choose your institutions and social practices, you choose your goods and your choose your risks. A risk-free society is a society free of ideals and a conception of the good.

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