

Hiroshi Uchida's analysis of *Grundrisse* and *Logic*

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1. Introduction

The 1988 Hiroshi Uchida published "*Marx's Grundrisse and Hegel's Logic*," which first made a claim that the *Grundrisse* "mirrored" the *Logic* comprehensively and systematically. I will do my best to outline the correspondences that Uchida claimed to unearth, but this will unavoidably be somewhat confusing. Refer to the table of contents for the *Grundrisse* and the *Logic* above. This table is not intended to suggest any correspondence between the two works.

Hiroshi Uchida's commentary was published in 1988, but commentaries on the *Grundrisse* had been published by Japanese Marists as early as 1974. Uchida was not only a scholar of Marx's political economic writing, but also a scholar of Hegel and Aristotle. In the *Grundrisse*, according to Uchida, Marx was criticising the political economists by means of a critique of Hegel because "Hegel adopts the standpoint of modern national economy" (Marx, 1844). Further, Uchida shared with Hegel and Marx an admiration for Aristotle, but according to Uchida, Marx accused Hegel of deforming Aristotle (p. 4), while Marx used Aristotle against Hegel particularly in order to develop his own philosophical materialism.

As Uchida tells it, however, in the course of criticising Hegel, Marx appropriates much of Hegel's *Logic*. In particular, Marx learns from Hegel how capital reproduces the presuppositions for its own existence, and is in that specific sense an organic system. However, Marx's central aim is to show how Hegel (and the political economists) obscure the *historical* origins of the conditions of existence of capitalism and the limits on its development. When cast in terms of logical categories, the social relations of capital appear for Hegel to be natural and eternal realities of human life. In fact, they are products of past history and are sowing the seeds of their own extinction. This is summed up in Marx's *logico-historical* method. What later appears as the "tendency of the rate of profit to fall" appears in the *Grundrisse* in a form anticipating the theme of "expropriation of the expropriators" and the preparation of the conditions for Socialism.

In the *Grundrisse*, then, Marx's debt to Hegel is quite explicit, whereas in the later economic manuscripts references to Hegel are much reduced, evidently for the purpose of making the economic critique more accessible. Uchida takes the reader through large swathes of the *Grundrisse* seeking to show paragraph-by-paragraph the textual links to the *Shorter Logic*.

According to Uchida:

[Marx's] "task in the *Grundrisse* therefore consists in demonstrating that the genesis of value and its development into capital are described in the *Logic*, albeit in a seemingly closed system which reproduces itself, and overall [Marx's] work is directed towards transcending capitalism in practice."

and

the *Logic* is the most abstract philosophical expression of the bourgeois spirit or consciousness of value. This consciousness of value forms the basic economic relation of bourgeois society.

(p. 4)

Uchida sees Marx tracing the development of value through the *Grundrisse*, from product, to commodity, to money in its successive guises as measure of value, means of exchange and hoard to merchant capital and industrial capital and gets as far as “constant” and “variable” capital, taken to be the *particular* forms of capital – and finally the abolition of capital by the transformation of capital into a single planned economy.

What is intriguing in Uchida’s retracing of the path of value from product to industrial capital is how the forms of value are mapped against the three books of the *Logic*. The various transitions are not quite neatly located in separate books of the *Logic*, however, as is suggested by the titles of Uchida’s chapters.

2. The Chapter on Money

Chapter 1 of Uchida’s book is entitled “Doctrine of the Concept,” and deals with the Introduction to the *Grundrisse* and, according to Uchida, Hegel’s “Doctrine of the Concept.” The next chapter in the *Grundrisse* is Chapter 2 on Money and according to Uchida, Hegel’s “Doctrine of Being.” This is followed in the *Grundrisse* by the extensive “Chapter on Capital” which Uchida deals with in his third chapter subtitled “Doctrine of Essence.”

We could briefly illustrates Uchida’s mapping as follows:

Uchida	<i>Grundrisse</i>	<i>Logic</i>
Chapter 1	Introduction	CONCEPT
Chapter 2	Money	BEING
Chapter 3	Capital	ESSENCE

That is, according to the *titles* Uchida assigns to his chapters. But when we look at the *content* of each chapter, the material Uchida places under each chapter heading does not match the location in Hegel’s *Logic* suggested in the chapter heading.

I will deal with Hegel’s advice on *where to begin* last. These are questions Hegel raises in an Introduction to the *Science of Logic*, but only answers in the last passages of the *Logic*, the Idea of Cognition, devoted to a discussion of the method of the *Logic* and its application to the sciences, even though both Uchida and Marx deal with these questions first. Otherwise, I will follow Uchida’s sequence.

The first section heading in Uchida’s Chapter 2 on “Money and Being,” reads “Product, commodity and money, and ‘identity, difference, opposition and contradiction’.” However, ‘Identity, Difference, Opposition and Contradiction’ are the “Moments of Reflection” in the *Logic*, concluding with ‘Ground’. These are the first moments of the first chapter of the Doctrine of Essence, Reflection and are very much *not* part of the Logic of Being. In fact, the moments of Reflection are the analytical moments of Essence and set out the form of movement which is characteristic of the whole of the Essence Logic.

Hegel's chapter on Reflection is concluded with the pair Form-and-Matter, laying the basis for the second chapter, Appearance, and the third chapter, Actuality, each of which are marked by *pairs* of concepts respectively Content-and-Form, and Cause-and-Effect. (The moments of Reflection are the *analytical* moments of the Doctrine of Essence, just as 'Being, Nothing, Becoming, Determinate Being and the One' are the analytical moments of the Doctrine of Being). But Uchida says that the Moments of Reflection are the "transition from being to essence" (p. 31). But there is a section Hegel entitled "Transition into Essence" in the *Science of Logic* and it is *not this*. Reflection definitely falls under Essence. Being is *immediate*, and Reflection is *relative*.

The form of movement we see in Reflection is where one concept pushes another to the side and overtakes it, so to speak, but rather than extinguishing the former, it includes and combines with it. Eventually, the resulting contradictions are resolved into Ground, which proves to be only a "deeper" contradiction, and the movement displayed in Reflection gives way to a succession of *pairs* of concepts, each in turn pushing the other into the background. In Appearance, the middle chapter of Essence, the pair is form-and-content *explicitly understood to be a contradiction*, entailing a succession of forms being endlessly overtaken by their content, constituting new forms. The third and final chapter of Essence, Actuality, is similar in structure inasmuch as when Ground comes forward as Effect, it is disclosed in turn as a Cause with new effects, again in an endless series of cause-and-effect which never gets to the bottom of matters, a "bad infinity." This bad infinity is characteristic of the Logic of Essence.

As Uchida continues examining this chapter of the *Grundrisse*, he continues to reflect on the Moments of Reflection (even though he claims to be linking the text in the *Grundrisse* to the Logic of Being!) and cites a further link to the same section at the beginning of the Essence Logic. After 5 pages, Uchida does move back to the early moments of Being with the transition to Quantity, in which he makes a plausible logical link between Marx's use value and exchange-value and Hegel's Determinate Being and Being-for-itself, but no evidence of an actual textual link. In Uchida's narrative, Marx continues to talk about money as the substance of exchange-value, and then refers again to "contradiction." Indeed, Hegel speaks here of "contradiction," but only the "contradiction" entailed in the *limit* implied in singling out one determinate being from another. Hegel's next mention of "contradiction" is extensive and repeated and is found in the Moments of Reflection in the Logic of Essence, and it is here that Uchida should have been connecting to the contradiction arising with the reflection of the exchange value of a commodity in money, another particular commodity. There is grounds, however, to say that Marx was here inspired by the Chapter on Measure. Uchida continues for some time along the same theme until citing Hegel again, this time in The Idea, the last chapter of the Doctrine of the Concept. Uchida now devotes himself to Marx's comments on Substance, one of the last phases of Essence before the leap to the Concept.

Uchida then covers "Price and Quantum." Quantum is indeed a category of Quantity in the Doctrine of Being, along with a number of other categories dealt with by Hegel in that same chapter, and Uchida cites the relevant passages. "One and the Many" dealt with next is indeed under Hegel's "Being-for-Self."

After several pages still plausibly connected to Being, Marx returns (apparently) to the Moments of Reflection under Essence. Later there are references to the *Phenomenology*, before citing Marx on Substance (part of Actuality) and The Idea (the final chapter of the *Logic*).

And so on. For the remainder of this chapter, Uchida finds cause to cite a couple of paragraphs near the end of the Doctrine of Being, but even more from the chapter on Reflection in the Essence Logic.

It is indeed hard to talk about the quantification of commodities as values, or the transformation of value into money, without finding some relevant quotes from the Logic of Being, especially Measure, the last chapter of the Doctrine of Being. However, the transformation of value from product to commodity to money is also clearly relevant to Essence, and Reflection in particular. Assuming that Marx was indeed inspired by the Hegel passages Uchida points out, insofar as Marx was talking about money, what we see is that Marx was mostly interested in Reflection. The Doctrine of Being nonetheless would have attracted Marx's attention in relation to the emergence of money as a measure of the value of commodities, Measure being the final chapter of the Doctrine of Being. But from Uchida's examination, it seems that in his work on money, Marx took inspiration from *every section of the Logic and the Phenomenology*. I see no basis in what Uchida has written for the Chapter heading linking Money to Being. The first form of value is the "commodity" itself, but Measure (such as "5 yards of linen"), the last chapter of Being, is not yet money. Measure generates the contradictions which then give rise to Reflection and the successive changes in the Form of Value. When we say: "5 yards of linen = 2 pounds" that is equally linkable to Measure or Reflection. Take your pick.

The reason for making these admittedly rather tedious points is that in recent times the question of *which* section of *Capital* reflects *which* section of the *Logic* has become a central matter of dispute. From the *actual evidence Uchida provides*, if the Chapter on Money "corresponds to" any section of the *Logic* at all, it is Reflection, not Being. As money changes from a measure of value to a means of circulation to commercial capital to industrial capital, without abolishing the previous form of value, this is classic Reflection in Hegelian terms. But Uchida's claim is that the section on Money reflects not Essence but Being.

3. The Chapter on Capital

Chapter 3 of Uchida's book is titled "The Chapter on Capital and the Doctrine of Essence," but the title is immediately followed by the subheading: "Part One. The Generality¹ of Capital." A later subheading refers to "Substance," and "Relation of Substantiality" explicitly referencing the second and third chapters of Essence. About half way through the Chapter, there is another subheading "Component Parts of Capital and 'the whole and the parts', and then 'Force and its Manifestation'." All the Hegel quotes confirm this connection. But after the subheading about 'Force' (from the Essence Logic) we see Marx taking up the

¹ The same German word, *Allgemeine*, may be translated as "general" or "universal." Hegel did distinguish the concept referred to here from that of "allness," that is, of some attribute which applies to each individual singly. See the comment on Rousseau on p. 113.

Particularisation of capital, which in the *Grundrisse* is based on what later became “variable” and “constant” capital (referencing the Concept Logic), and ‘surplus capital’ enters the narrative along with primitive accumulation. Uchida continues to connect Marx’s concerns about the forms of capital and cites sections mainly from the Essence Logic (Actuality as Cause-and-Effect and Substance). Thus, he says, Marx’s “critique of political economy is the genesis of the two ‘forms’, value and capital” (p. 93).

And Uchida comments:

In economic relations, according to Marx, results or effects turn into presuppositions or causes. His model of an organic system of circular self-reproduction depends on Hegel’s account of ‘causality’.

(p. 99)

However, Uchida does not see that capital’s systematic reproduction of its own presuppositions is what is characteristic of an *organism*, and it is the Doctrine of the *Concept* which represents the logic of an organic *system*, in the Subject and in its transition from Subject and Object to the Idea. This crucial idea about capital as a self-reproducing whole is *not* that of the bad infinity of Causality represented in the Doctrine of Essence.

The final section of the book is an outline of the three critiques of Hegel’s *Logic* which Marx has exposed in the *Grundrisse*. I will return to this later.

What we see in the Chapter on Capital is, I think, plausible links to the latter parts of Essence, but there are also clear allusions to the first two moments of the Concept, Universality and Particularity, though these moments arise in the narrative in a manner clearly relevant to the main lines of the argument for ‘transition from money to capital’.

Overall, Uchida’s claim that the *Grundrisse*’s theme is the transition from product, to money to capital, is confirmed by his textual analysis, and consequently, in the main, both chapters 2 and 3 “correspond” to the Logic of Essence, with the proviso that Being is relevant to the first phase, in which a product acquires various forms of value, while the transition from substance to Concept necessarily entails a reference to the logic of the Concept as the outcome, not itself part of the Doctrine of Essence.

4. Introduction to the *Grundrisse*

Chapter One of Uchida’s book is titled: “The Introduction to the *Grundrisse* and the ‘Doctrine of the Concept’.”

Uchida is undoubtedly correct to begin from the Concept Logic in his study of the *Grundrisse*. Hegel recommends that the logical order of proceeding is to begin the ‘synthesis’ of the phenomenon from a product of analysis in the form of a “universal individual” and to proceed from there to particularity. The path which I have followed above, of value from product to capital which Uchida claims is Marx’s main theme in the *Grundrisse*, bears some resemblance to the path of cognition in the *Logic* from Being to Essence to Concept. This, however, has put me at odds with Uchida’s own order of presentation.

When we look at the content of the Logic of the Concept, it is really only the first chapter of the Logic of the Concept (the Subject) in which we would expect to

find ground-breaking work on capital, because the second Chapter of the *Logic* of the Concept (the Object) is to do with the interaction of capital with *other* activities, and the final two chapters of the Idea outline the methodology of the *Logic* and then summarises the whole of the *Logic*. So only the first section of the Concept, the Subject, could represent capital as such.

So what topics does the Introduction to the *Grundrisse* actually deal with? I will follow Uchida's commentary here.

Marx begins by defining the subject matter as production in general which Uchida connects to the main, first section of The Idea, Life, which concludes the systematic unfolding of the Idea which Hegel has raced throughout the *Logic*. (The remaining chapters of the Idea reflect on the method of the *Logic*). As Uchida points out, Marx is here laying out his main line of critique of Hegel and the political economists – they all treat the activities of individuals in abstraction from the *historically* determined social context, namely capital. Marx further alleges that Hegel treats the human being as simply a “being,” without taking account of the human mind, as if mind and body were separate. In fact, Hegel deals with both these issues in what he sees as the appropriate place, not in the *Logic* but in the “Objective Spirit,” in his *social* theory. Hegel never *claimed* that the *Logic* was about social relations. But Marx's point rests on his claim that, unconsciously, both Hegel and the political economists have *naturalised* logic as if it were a *timeless* reflection of “human nature.” Hegel naturalises a range of social behaviour, including gender relations, divisions of labour and private property. According to Uchida, this rupture between the mental and the material is reflected both in the vulgar materialism of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and in Hegel's Idealism. Hegel's Idealism leads to Hegel *adopting* the capitalists' value-consciousness and expressing this consciousness in logic, with value as an active and knowing Subject.

Uchida writes: “As we will see later in detail, the ‘subject’ in the Doctrines of Being and of Essence is an ideal subject *par excellence*” (p. 13). “Subject” is not a category in Being and Essence (the Objective Logic) which constitute the “*genesis* of the Concept” and which figure throughout Uchida's analysis of the remainder of the *Grundrisse*. The Subject is the first chapter of the Concept. One could claim that there is an ideal subject implicit in the Objective Logic, but it seems odd to me to describe such a subject as “ideal *par excellent*” given that is not yet self-conscious and is not mentioned in these sections of the *Logic*. Self-consciousness is what characterises the Subject, which is in the Concept Logic.

Marx then proceeds to critique the fundamental concepts of political economy in a pair-wise fashion, such as exchange-and-production, demonstrating how each of the political economists grasp these pairs in a one-sided way, reflecting the standpoint of different sections of the capitalist class. In this trope, Marx is unquestionably utilising Hegelian techniques of criticism illustrated in the Doctrine of Essence, while drawing from his own work in the 1840s. Marx further goes on to criticise Hegel's conception of ‘Life’ the last chapter of the Idea.

The Method of Political Economy

Uchida considers the section entitled “Method of Political Economy” to be very important in identifying the method of ascending from the abstract to the

concrete as reflecting the method of the earliest writers such as Wm. Petty and reflective of Hegel's *synthetic* method as described in the penultimate section of The Idea, and the method of Adam Smith and the later political economists, of building a *system* of political economy, by ascending from the simplest, most abstract determinations to a concrete, conceptual representation of the whole. This distinction is explained in the penultimate section of the Idea, the Idea of Cognition. Marx says that the synthetic method is the "scientifically correct one," and (referencing the three moments of the Subject in the Doctrine of the Concept), Uchida remarks:

"In Marx's work this is reflected in the triadic composition of the Chapter on Capital in the *Grundrisse* as I. Generality of Capital, II. Particularity of Capital, III. Individuality of Capital"

(p. 21)

and that

"What Hegel says in 'the development of the moments of the concept' signifies for Marx that reality is mentally reproduced and appropriated as the concrete concept. This is a totality of manifold determinations in the mind, so categories in the *Doctrine of Being* become presuppositions of the notion of capital, and categories in the *Doctrine of Essence* develop from generality or the 'concept' itself, towards particularity or judgment, and up to individuality or syllogism. Marx thus turns the two doctrines of the objective logic [i.e., Being and Essence] into objective moments of the mental reproduction of the concrete. This reflects Hegel's triad – generality, particularity, individuality – in the *Doctrine of the Concept*"

(p. 21).

This is confusing. Firstly, Uchida agrees that the correct method is Hegel's synthetic method, but is reflected in the *Grundrisse*'s Chapter on Capital, which Uchida has characterised as Reflecting the Logic of Essence, and *then* states (correctly) that these are moments, not of Essence, but of the Concept, while claiming the moments of the Subjective Concept falls under Essence. Further, Marx has agreed that these moments reflect real *historical* moments and uses them himself in his logical representation of the capitalist system. Uchida does not recognise the "leaps" in the *Logic* from Being to Reflection (as part of the Essence Logic), and from Essence to Subject (as part of the Concept Logic). Effectively he moves each boundary one chapter forward from where Hegel put it.

Uchida's criticism here is that, according to Marx, Hegel thinks that the real process of development of the concrete follows the same path as the logical development of the concrete in the mind. *Both* writers take it that the object exists outside of the individual mind. However, Hegel takes it that the objectification of the ideal is the natural social process, whereas Marx sees the process of subjection of individuals to these bourgeois relations through a social division of labour in which the mental rules over the physical. Hegel is not aware that the process of objectification becomes alienation and is itself an *historical* form of this division of labour. Smith and Ricardo, on the other hand,

“unconsciously reify or transubstantiate value-consciousness into material products” as “vulgar materialists” (p. 23).

Marx follows Adam Smith in defining the “simplest” categories as “exchange-value, possession, money, exchange and labour in general,” but he traces the *historical* origins of these through the pre-capitalist development of the form of value, chiefly money.

Here Uchida points to Hegel’s view of development as a “circle,” the starting point of the “simplest determinations” is also the endpoint of the analysis, the conceptual concrete, and Uchida reminds us that the German word for Essence, *Wesen*, is the past tense of Being (*Sein*), “was.” Uchida sees here a reference to the cycle: capital – product – commodity – money – capital; i.e., forms of existence of value, capital withdrawn from circulation and then returned to circulation. Uchida takes this as affirmation of the characterisation of the movement of capital as *Essence*. Uchida says that the question which arises for Marx, however, is whether the first pre-positing was made by capital (as would be consistent with Hegel’s notion of a “circle” or whether on the contrary the presuppositions of capital were first posited by pre-capitalist formations. Is capital a “self-moving subject” or is it historical (and therefore transitory) in form?

As Uchida has shown, Marx adopts a *logico-historical* method which is concerned with historical origins of the presuppositions of bourgeois society. Later on in the Chapter on Capital, Uchida points out that Marx investigates primitive accumulation and the changing form of money from means of circulation, hoards, and finally capital. Uchida expresses this in summary:

Marx reads the *Logic* as the phenomenology or genesis of the value-consciousness described in the *Chapter on Money* and the *Chapter on Capital* in the *Grundrisse*.

(p. 25)

Hegel saw his *Phenomenology* as the preface to his system as outlined in the *Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia*. It seems that Uchida invites us to see these two chapters of the *Grundrisse* in the same way. These chapters correspond to Being and Essence according to Uchida, which Hegel calls the “Objective Logic,” or the *genesis* of the Concept, logically prior to the Subject becoming self-conscious. By simply participating in exchange, buyers and sellers unconsciously share their value-consciousness and reify value as money.

Further, Marx’s logico-historical method leads to Marx’s speculative reflections on the developing consciousness of the working class. Uchida follows on here in the Introduction through his analysis of tendencies he sees within the capitalist system itself. These reflections belong within a *logical, speculative critique* of the concept of capital itself. I believe that Uchida fails to adequately distinguish between the historical pre-conditions of capital (the logical genesis of the concept of capital) and analysis of the concept of capital itself including the speculative critique of this concept. Equally, he has failed to distinguish between Being which is serial and *immediate*, Essence in which everything is *relative* and the Concept which is *organic* development. Being Marx’s first manuscript in a ten-year long labour to produce *Capital*, there was no reason for Marx to separate out these aspects of his work into separate chapters reflecting these

distinctions, but I think it is incumbent on later commentators to make such distinctions explicit, based on the textual evidence, if they are to make these claims.

Uchida points out that the plan drawn up by Marx at this point reflects Hegel's method in that it begins from the general and simple, through "external considerations," to Particularity, and then remarks that this structure is "manifested throughout the *Chapter on Capital*," contradicting his claim in the final chapter of his book that the *Chapter on Capital* in the *Grundrisse* is reflective of Hegel's doctrine of Essence. Much of what Uchida has to say about what Marx is doing in the *Grundrisse* has merit, but his efforts to pin the development of Marx's argument to Hegel's *Logic* is utterly confused.

5. Marx's Critiques of Hegel

Uchida sums up his analysis of the *Grundrisse* by outlining three principal lines of Marx's critique of Hegel, which he entitles the Generality, Particularity and Individuality of Capital, mimicking Hegel's Moments of the Concept.

a. Generality of Capital

Marx's first line of critique of Hegel (and by implication, of the Political Economists) is whether capital generates a closed circle in the form of an eternal circular chain of causality or whether the conditions for the existence of capital are historical products which are eventually *negated* by capitalism itself. Marx agrees, he says, with Hegel's view of "circular causality" (Reciprocity and Absolute Necessity – in fact the final phase of the Doctrine of Essence). He likens the emergence of value-consciousness associated with the changing forms of value with Hegel's *Phenomenology*. The demise of capitalism is anticipated in the growing self-consciousness of the proletariat arising from contradictions within the logic of capital.

The transition from money to capital is mediated by the pre-capitalist economic formations in which Marx traces the origins of the presuppositions for capital:

- free exchange,
- free labour-power,
- free funds and
- the accumulation of money.

He says that Marx shows that "capitalism is a logico-historical system that is open," in contrast with Hegel's logical system that is closed and timeless. Uchida likens the historical emergence of capitalism to Hegel's *Phenomenology* and Hegel's Objective Logic: Being and Essence.

Uchida however has blurred the distinction between Essence, which can go no further than an infinite chain of causality, something characteristic of Essence, and the Concept which transcends this bad infinity, with the character of an Organic, self-reproducing whole with its three Moments. According to Uchida, Marx agrees that capital is such a self-reproducing whole, but its capacity for self-reproduction is *finite*, and its presuppositions were first produced by *pre*-capitalist formations and primitive accumulation.

In Hegel's defence, I would say that although neither Hegel's *Logic* or the *Philosophy of Right* make any suggestion of the demise of a social formation, but *all* the books of the *Encyclopaedia* end with a transition to a higher sphere which is at the same time a return to its own origins. That is how the "circle of circles" is formed.

Note also, that regarding the "Method of Political Economy," both Uchida and Marx at this point have overlooked the fact that Hegel's *Logic* is *both* synthetic and *analytical*. Synthesis presupposes analysis; analysis presupposes synthesis. As a result, the problem of *how* the starting point for the synthetic development exhibited in *Capital* is to be determined was never clearly explained nor is it understood in our day.

b. Particularity of Capital

Following this consideration of the 'generality' of capital, Uchida moves to the particularity of capital which Uchida identifies in Marx's distinction between fixed and circulating capital, and again, we see Marx showing that the presuppositions for this particularisation are found in pre-capitalist formations, and the extinction of these conditions found in the logic of capital. Here the particularity leads to the social accumulation of large amount of surplus or "disposable time," a concept which Marx appropriated from an 18th century economist. Thus Marx also identifies the appearance of the concept of *relative surplus value* and the prospect of a decrease in the general rate of profit, and with this, the education of the working class and the growing redundancy of the capitalist.

Again we see a combination of historicism (absent from the *Logic*) and logical analysis, appropriated from the *Logic* but with Marx highlighting the contradictions within the supposedly closed system of capital, which lay the preconditions for socialism.

c. Individuality of Capital

When Uchida refers to the "III. The Individuality of Capital," he cites various sections of the last Notebook which are indexed by the translator mostly under "Miscellaneous." It could be related to the historical origins of industrial capital identified by Marx: the transformation of independent producers into wage-labourers; the organisation of wage labourers into manufacture, and the transformation of merchant capital into industrial capital, and subsequently its own abolition.

Thus, Uchida may see "Individuality of capital" as referring to capital moving "from 'a whole' to 'one determinate totality' [revealing] the real possibility of practical transcendence," and the final outcome of this logic-historical development of capital in which the proletariat takes political power and *plans* economic development. So, the "Individual" moment of capital refers to the capitalist system's final destiny as a single planned economy controlled by the working class.

The drift of Marx's critique of Hegel dealt with in this section is this: that "Hegel's idealism is not merely philosophical speculation, but rather a real expression of the relations of modern private property – a philosophical

expression of its own economic background, i.e. the relation of value and capital, the basic relation of modern bourgeois society” (p. 138). Consequently, the relations which Hegel takes as confined to moments of cognition, Marx sees as characterising *real* moments of the development of value. Marx sees a metaphor which shows how this is possible:

“Marx critically suggests that Hegel's *Logic*, in which an ideal subject or 'idea' appears to posit itself and all other objects, is similar to political economy, in which value and capital do likewise”

(p. 138).

In Marx's own words:

Therefore, to the kind of consciousness – and this is characteristic of the philosophical consciousness – for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of production ... this is correct in so far as the concrete totality is a totality of thoughts, concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and comprehending; but not in any way a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception; a product, rather, of the working-up of observation and conception into concepts. The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical and mental appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition.

(Marx, 1973/1858, p. 101)

Conclusion

Uchida has shown how extensively Marx was both appropriating and criticising Hegel's *Logic* and developing his philosophical materialism while engaged with the political economists. However, to figure out from this work which parts of the *Logic* are implicated in which parts of his critique of political economy it is necessary to look closely at which paragraphs of the *Logic* Marx is referencing as they do not correspond to what is implied by Uchida's chapter headings. Equally, the chapter headings of the *Grundrisse* do not map nicely on to what became the volumes of *Capital*. However, Marx's plans for *Capital* constantly changed over the 10 years between writing the *Grundrisse* and writing *Capital*.

Uchida claims that Marx is aiming to disclose the dynamics of capital by means of a logico-historical tracing of value from product to commodity to money to capital and subsequently to different components of capital and, speculatively, to the transformation of value to a single social whole following the overthrow of capital. This claim is well-made.

Marx's lines of critique of Hegel are well established by Uchida, viz.,

- that, by naturalising human practice and ignoring the genesis of practice which *produced* the presuppositions of both capital *and* the *Logic*, Hegel mistook historical product for an eternal circle of reproduction of capital.
- that while revealing real dynamics of human practice in his *Logic*, Hegel failed to realise that these practices are products of history, in turn the source of the philosopher 's abstractions.
- that Hegel has failed to identify the contradictions in the capitalist "organism," but which Marx was able to reveal by appropriating Hegel's logical method.

Mapping the *Grundrisse* on to the *Logic* was already widely discussed by the time Uchida wrote this book, but his was the first really comprehensive attempt to complete the task. Uchida was unique in seeing Marx's text as criticising the ahistorical stance of both Hegel and the Political Economists. Others who have followed Uchida in this study see the opposite: that Marx was adopting Hegel's a-historicism. I will now consider one other, even more comprehensive effort, which positively ascribes an anti-historicism to Marx.